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The cinematic image of a young woman staring into the camera – 
crying, hyperventilating, and talking directly to her audience – 
has become the definitive image of The Blair Witch Project 
(Myrick and Sanchez, 1999).   It is arguably the most famous 
scene, and certainly the most parodied image of found footage 
horror cinema in general, perhaps even one of the defining 
images of cinema in the 1990s. This character, Heather Donahue, 
is played by a hitherto unknown actress called Heather Donahue, 
in her feature debut. From what we see on screen, and the 
manner in which her monologue is delivered, it can be inferred 
that she is not reciting scripted lines. She does not seem to be 
acting; her fear appears genuine. Heather is alone in a dark tent, 
shooting this footage herself with a handheld camera. The shot 
did not look like most other horror  films  that  had been 
previously shown in cinemas; it is poorly framed, poorly lit, and 
the character knows and acknowledges that she is on camera. 
There had been previous films in this style: Cannibal Holocaust 
(Deodato, 1980) contains the use of ‘found footage’ within its 
narrative structure, and Man Bites Dog (Belvaux, Bonzel and 
Poelvoorde, 1992) is a mock-documentary that purports to be 
completely filmed by a diegetic film crew. However, neither of 
these films had the cultural impact or box office success of The 
Blair Witch Project, a film that eventually spawned numerous 
imitators, and arguably the entire found footage horror sub- 
genre that now consists of hundreds of films.1
There is a straightforward economic reason why filmmakers 
continue to produce found footage horror films. The Blair 
Witch  Project  made over $248 million at the worldwide box 
office2 on a $60,000 produc-  tion budget, thus ensuring that
a new subgenre of horror films, labelled by critics as ‘found 
footage’ films, was born. As Brigid Cherry argues, ‘since 
many horror films are produced at the low budget end of the 
scale, filmmakers are forced by circumstance to be 
innovative or inventive with what little resources they do 
have access to, often making a virtue of ne- cessity’ (2009, 
34). Found footage horror films are cheap to make, with the 
highest budget to date being $25 million for Cloverfield 
(Reeves, 2008), but most are far cheaper. The majority of 
these films have budgets less than $1 million, and with the 
exception of a few, all have made a profit. With such small 
budgets, the financial outlay for investors is  low,  and the 
potential gross can be significant in the case of some of     the 
popular found footage films (see Table 0.1). The most 
successful ti- tles grossed over 20 times the amount that 
they cost to produce: The  Last Broadcast (Avalos and Weiler, 
1998)  reportedly  cost  only  $900, but made $4 million; 
Paranormal Activity (Peli, 2007) had a production cost of 
$15,000 before earning $193 million at the global box 
office. 
Economics are not the only reason for the ubiquity and 
popularity of these films. Their cheap-looking aesthetic is in 
fact a virtue because it     is their look that makes them 
appear similar to authentic documenta- ries and home 
videos. Filmmakers working in genres other than horror 
have also begun to utilise the diegetic camera to create this 
distinctive aesthetic. For example, the release of Chronicle 
(Trank, 2012), End of Watch (Ayer, 2012), and Into the Storm 
(Quale, 2014) has seen budgets raise dramatically and the 
employment of found footage aesthetic and narrative 
strategies in superhero films, police dramas, and disaster 
films, respectively. Science fiction films such as Earth to Echo 
(Green, 2014) and Project Almanac (Israelite, 2015) have 
also recently adopted the approach, indicating the influence 
of low-budget horror filmmakers on more mainstream 
practitioners. 
Top 10 budget to gross ratios in the found footage subgenre 
Film Budget Gross Budget-to- 
gross ratio 
Paranormal Activity $15,000 $193,355,800 1:12,890 
The Last Broadcast $900 $4,000,000 1:4444 
The Blair Witch Project $60,000 $248,639,099 1:4144 
Unfriended $1,000,000 $64,056,643 1:64 
Paranormal Activity 2 $3,000,000 $177,512,032 1:59 
The Zombie Diaries $10,668 $526,552 1:49 
Paranormal Activity 3 $5,000,000 $207,039,844 1:41 
The Last Exorcism $1,800,000 $67,738,090 1:37 
Paranormal Activity 4 $5,000,000 $142,817,992 1:28 
Cannibal Holocaust $100,000 $2,000,000 1:20 
This book reveals why and how the diegetic camera technique 
has become so popular to both contemporary horror filmmakers 
and audiences. I adopt a mainly cognitive theoretical framework 
in order to ad- dress the mental schemata and processes that are 
elicited and triggered by these films. I explore the concept of the 
diegetic camera and argue that this aesthetic and narrational 
technique can have many effects on the cognition of the viewer, 
including his or her moral evaluation of characters and the 
empathy he or she feels with the characters. Utilising and 
applying theoretical notions such as schema, priming, 
identification, recognition, alignment, and allegiance to the 
analysis of key films allows me to examine how the viewer’s 
mind works when watching these films. In particular, Jean Piaget 
(1952) defined the notion of schemata as units of knowledge that 
people can draw upon when reacting to incoming stimuli. This 
suggests that viewers can organise information from films and 
use this information as a framework for future understanding. 
This is enmeshed with the concept of priming, suggesting that the 
early scenes in a film are vital in creating a mood for the viewer 
based on their previous knowledge of the techniques that they 
are seeing. I also consider how restricted narration is set up and 
maintained in these films. This     is narration that is restricted 
beyond most other films previously made, with the exception of 
Lady in the Lake (Montgomery, 1947), a film in which the viewer 
is almost wholly limited to seeing events from the point of view 
(POV) of the protagonist. 
This book explores how found  footage  horror  films  create  a  
sense of increased immediacy and alignment with the characters 
through various techniques associated with the diegetic camera 
trend. It is less important that these films are known as ‘found 
footage’, and more significant that they are shot with a ‘diegetic 
camera’,  hence  my  use  of this latter term to describe the films 
analysed in this book. Some of the films contain reference to the 
actual ‘finding’ of the footage (e.g.  The Blair Witch Project) and 
others do not (e.g. Man Bites Dog). There is always the 
implication that the footage  has  been  found  and  can now be 
revealed to the viewer. More importantly, however, there is 
always     a diegetic camera operator present at the events being 
revealed. I inter- rogate the concept of identification by using 
cognitive concepts such as recognition, alignment, and allegiance 
(Smith, 1995). These individual concepts break down the notion 
of identification into distinct processes, allowing for a more 
rigorous examination of the idea of identification. Analysing 
these films from a cognitive perspective enables an exploration of 
the mechanisms of an audience’s responses to the characters and 
to narrative and aesthetic strategies, including how priming and 
self-consciousness eventually affect the audience’s perception 
and cognition of the films. 
Throughout the book, I will use the term ‘diegetic camera films’ 
rather than found footage films, even though this category of 
films can be de- fined in many different ways. Alexandra Heller-
Nicholas (2014, 13) offers the definition that they are simply 
‘films that feature material that   is literally found or discovered’. 
In films such as The Blair Witch Project and Cloverfield, there is 
clear reference to the retrieval of tapes or memory cards that 
contain footage and the entire narration consists of revealing this 
supposedly discovered material. However, in others such as The 
Last Broadcast, only certain sequences in the film consist of found 
footage and are situated within a given framing narrative as part 
of a larger mock-documentary narrational and aesthetic strategy. 
Therefore, Heller-Nicholas broadens the definition to include all 
‘movies filmed with diegetic hand-held cameras, surveillance 
cameras, or both’ (2014, 13–14). For the purpose of clarity and 
precision, it is also important to distinguish diegetic camera 
horror films from the preceding use of the term found footage. In 
scholarly work on film, found footage was traditionally a term 
used to describe those films that ‘employ material shot by 
someone else for another  reason’  (Heller-Nicholas,  2014,  14) 
such as A Movie (Conner, 1958) and The Clock (Marclay, 2010). 
The films analysed in this book can to some extent be considered 
fictional versions of these original found footage films. Originally, 
the  term  found  foot- age referred to a moving image collage of 
non-fiction footage. The films now being labelled as found 
footage and, in particular, those that are    the subject of this book 
fictionalise this conceit. They are comprised of footage that has 
supposedly already been shot by someone (a character within the 
film) and has now either been edited or left as it was found, and 
finally released as a film product. 
Scott Meslow (2012) recognises that found footage films are 
‘built on the conceit that the movie was filmed … by a 
character that exists within the film’s world – and whose 
footage was discovered sometime after the events of the film’. 
While this is an excellent definition, it does not do enough to 
separate and recognise the diversity within this group of films. 
Heller-Nicholas calls this body of films ‘a distinct horror cate- 
gory with its own readily identifiable features, some of which 
stem from documentary traditions and associated evolving 
trends in the field of mockumentary’ (2014, 16). However, 
many of the films analysed have features that appear more 
familiar when compared to home videos and reality television. 
Therefore, I will divide the focus films into three distinct, albeit 
overlapping, categories: documentary and reality TV, home 
videos, and charismatic killers. More specifically: 
1 The first category contains those films whose conventions 
most resemble documentaries, mockumentaries, and reality 
television programmes such as The Blair Witch Project, Noroi: 
The Curse (Shiraishi, 2005), and Rec (Balagueró and Plaza, 
2007). The Blair Witch Project is about three student 
filmmakers who enter the woods of Burkitsville in order to 
make a documentary on the legend of the Blair Witch. The film 
is comprised of the footage they suppos- edly shot  before  
their  disappearance.  Noroi: The Curse focuses  on a 
paranormal investigator who disappeared while making a 
docu- mentary, The Curse. The film is comprised mostly of the 
recordings of the investigator’s camera operator Miyajima. Rec 
is about the presenter of a reality television programme who 
is quarantined in an apartment block in Barcelona when a 
virus is unleashed. Her cam- era operator Pablo keeps filming 
through the night, and therefore, Rec is supposedly all of 
Pablo’s footage. 
2 The second category includes those films whose conventions 
most resemble home videos such as Paranormal Activity, 
Exhibit A (Rotheroe, 2007) and Cloverfield. Paranormal 
Activity is about a couple, Katie and Micah, who believe they 
are being haunted, which prompts Micah to buy a camera and 
film everything that is happen- ing in his home. Exhibit A 
follows a middle-class family who are undergoing financial 
and domestic problems as the daughter films the family. 
Cloverfield is about a group of friends who are in New York 
when the city is attacked by a monster. One character, Hud, 
films the events as they unfold overnight. 
3 The third category bridges the aesthetic, technical, and 
perceptual gap between the first and second categories; that is, 
between the most seemingly professional examples and those 
that look the most am- ateurish. This category – which I call 
charismatic killers – includes examples ranging from those 
filmed by documentary crews to out- right amateurs using 
domestic camcorders. What distinguishes these films from 
those in the first and second categories is that the camera 
operators are less victims of the horror, and more complicit 
with   the actions of the monsters they are documenting. The 
‘monster’ may even be considered by some to be an appealing 
anti-hero, hence my use of the term ‘charismatic killers’. In 
this category, the focus films are Man Bites Dog, The Last 
Horror Movie (Richards, 2003), Zero Day (Coccio, 2003), and 
Autohead (Mittal, 2016).  Man  Bites Dog is about a 
documentary crew who follow a serial killer as he goes about 
his business, and eventually become accomplices with his 
actions. The Last Horror Movie follows a serial killer who has 
con- vinced an assistant to  make  a  documentary  about  him. 
Zero Day is comprised of the footage of two teens who  film 
themselves  as they prepare to commit a massacre at their 
high school. Autohead concerns a documentary crew that 
follow a Mumbai auto rickshaw driver as he embarks on a 
killing spree. 
Some readers familiar with the films listed above will 
undoubtedly note that my categorisation of these films as all 
belonging to the horror genre is contentious. For example, Man 
Bites Dog has been called a crime film or a black comedy, and 
Cloverfield could also be considered a science- fiction film. Zero 
Day and Exhibit A could also be only loosely considered horror 
films. However, it is not my intention to engage with genre theory 
in this book. As Xavier Aldana Reyes (2016a, 150) points out, 
found footage is not a subgenre of horror. It is a framing 
technique and   it can be applied to many different genres of film 
and subgenres of horror. The genre crossover and hybridity of 
the films selected above must be noted, but the representation of 
dark and disturbing subject matter and the aim to elicit fear, 
terror, dread, and shock is what primarily sets these films apart 
from other diegetic camera films (such as Chronicle or End of 
Watch). 
The films chosen are representative examples of each of the three 
categories that I have listed above. Some of these films have been 
chosen  for their cultural impact, influence on other films, and 
box office success (The Blair Witch Project, Paranormal Activity), 
some for their demonstration of the global reach of the  diegetic  
camera  technique  (Noroi: The Curse, Autohead), and others 
specifically for their genre hybridity (Man Bites Dog, Zero Day, 
Exhibit A). I have also mostly avoided those films that require a 
‘double priming’ of the audience. These films mix  media forms, 
for example by first appearing to be a traditional film and then 
later utilising the diegetic camera approach. In these films, there  
are changes in the media form being mimicked; at first the film 
may appear to be a news report, then a documentary, and then a 
home video. Examples of these films include Cannibal Holocaust  
(Deodato,  1980), The Zombie Diaries (Bartlett and Gates, 2006), 
Diary of the Dead (Romero, 2007), Resurrecting the  Street  Walker  
(Uyanik,  2009),  and Rec 2 (Balagueró and Plaza, 2009). 
Furthermore, I do not include films that are distinguished by 
their diegetic cameras being used for either surveillance or 
communication purposes rather than the creation of a media 
product such as a documentary or a home  video.  For example,  
My  Little Eye  (Evans,  2002) is supposedly made for an audience 
on the internet where viewers can watch a house full of 
‘contestants’ and their every moves over the course of six 
months. Surveillance cameras are planted all around the house to 
watch the contestants. Similarly, Alone with Her (Nicholas, 2006) 
uses surveillance technology, but the subject of the camera’s gaze 
is not aware of being watched and the end product is not 
designed to be watched by people over the internet. A character 
also wears surveillance cameras   on his person in order to 
capture further footage of the girl who is his subject. On the other 
hand, The Collingswood Story  (Costanza,  2002) and Unfriended 
(Gabriadze, 2014) have their characters communicating through 
webcams attached to computers. These films raise different is- 
sues in their aesthetic strategies, and my focus in this book is 
largely on the use of POV shots created by diegetic cameras. 
Approaching Diegetic Camera Horror 
Recently, there has been an increasing amount of scholarly 
attention to diegetic camera horror films. Zachary Ingle uses the 
term ‘diegetic cam- era’, which he defines as ‘a camera within the 
diegesis, acknowledged by the characters, which is quite different 
from the typical subjective cam- era’ (2011, 32). The diegetic 
camera is different to the subjective camera due to the supposed 
origin of the  footage.  With  the  subjective  cam- era, the origin 
is supposedly the eye of a character, whereas with the diegetic 
camera, the origin is the lens of a camera that is present within 
the diegesis. Using the adjective ‘diegetic’ to describe the camera 
in these films is accurate in that it indicates that the camera is a 
prop that is part of the fictional world, and therefore a profilmic 
element. To be more precise, the camera is being used to narrate 
at what  Gérard  Genette calls the intradiegetic level (1980, 228). 
This is where a character within the story appears to tell the 
narrative, rather than some unseen extradiegetic narrator or 
narrating instance. 
Keira McKenzie (2011) calls the found footage horror trend 
‘reality horror’ but takes a more contentious approach, claiming 
that ‘the viewer has become one of the characters, the imaginary 
real has become experiential and the viewer is directly involved 
in the narrative as it unfolds around them’ (2011, 39). This 
statement requires some attention and further consideration in 
the book, particularly with reference to off-screen space and the 
idea that important narrative events are occurring behind the 
camera. McKenzie also argues that ‘Reality Horror enforces 
engagement and in becoming one of the hapless characters 
within the film, the viewer cannot maintain distance between the 
events of the story and their own viewing’ (2011, 40). The 
spectator’s position is like that of a character immersed in the 
diegetic events, rather than being in the position of the more 
traditional invisible observer. However, when watching a diegetic 
camera film, I contend that there is still some distance. The 
viewer is forced to imagine some of the events and characters 
that are behind the camera, and therefore, the viewer still feels 
some detachment from the story and events. 
Don Tresca also uses the term ‘reality horror’ and argues that 
these films place ‘the audience in the “documentary mode of 
engagement,” creating an expectation of reality, and then 
undercutting such expectation by introducing elements into the 
film that cannot exist in reality (e.g. ghosts, giant monsters, 
demons, witches, etc.)’ (2011, 45). Tresca also asserts that after 
viewing reality horror: 
the audience no longer feels safe and comfortable in the real world 
because the films imply that such terrors exist outside the movie 
experience. Even though, logically, the audience understands the 
fictional nature of the films, the audience mindset has been condi- 
tioned to create an assumption that any film presented in a docu- 
mentary fashion is reality. 
(2011, 47) 
Although Tresca’s claim points to a different experience for 
viewers of diegetic camera films, I would argue that he has 
overstated the power    of these films to convince the audience. 
This is a central concern of this book as I consider the ways the 
spectator is primed to read and interpret the film in a different 
manner to more traditional narrative films. 
Diegetic camera films may not make audiences feel less safe in 
the real world as Tresca suggests, but they do encourage viewers 
to engage in a more visceral imagining that what is presented is 
real footage. 
In their edited collection Digital Horror, Linnie Blake and Xavier 
Aldana Reyes situate the diegetic camera horror film as one of 
many techniques that filmmakers use when contributing to the 
digital horror phenomenon more widely. Blake and Aldana Reyes 
include haunted technologies, handheld horrors, and diegetic 
camera films under the same digital horror category, arguing that 
the world has become increasingly networked and that this 
networking is subject to ongoing monitoring (2016, 1). Their 
definition of digital horror is ‘any type of horror that actively 
purports to explore the dark side of contemporary life in      a 
digital age governed by informational flows, rhizomatic public 
net- works, virtual simulation and visual hyper-stimulation’ 
(2016, 3). Blake and Aldana Reyes argue that digital horror deals 
with four main anxieties over digital technologies: the 
proliferation of mediated images of real-world violence, the 
potential for surveillance societies, exposure of users to 
unwanted attention, and the impact these technologies could 
have on human identity (2016, 3). They highlight that the move 
towards more handheld forms of horror reflects the  ‘will to  
truth’  during  the era of the ‘War on Terror’ where many 
members of the public felt they were being lied to by the 
government (2016, 3). While Blake and Aldana Reyes’ volume 
conflates diegetic camera horror films with other digital horror 
films such as FeardotCom (Malone, 2002) and Pulse (Sonzero, 
2006), there are significant essays that specifically analyse 
diegetic cam- era horror films. 
Most notably, Aldana Reyes discusses the affective possibilities 
and stylistic limitations of found footage horror in his own 
contribution to the edited volume. Here he argues that ‘found 
footage is almost inextricable from affect’ (2016b, 150) and that 
found footage is a ‘framing technique’ (2016b, 150) rather than a 
subgenre of horror. With particular reference to Rec, Aldana 
Reyes  also  discusses  the  limitations  of the narrative and 
aesthetic diegetic camera technique. He notes that the camera is 
limited in its movement, that non-diegetic music cannot be used, 
and that there always has to be a ‘real reason for the recording      
to be taking place’ (2016b, 155).  Furthermore, Aldana Reyes 
insists in  his essay, Reel Evil, that ‘“found footage” needs to be 
understood as a framing or narrative technique marking the 
product at a stylistic, but   not a thematic, level’ (2015, 2). His 
work reveals that  found  footage films vary greatly in tone and 
purpose and that there are many different thematic strands of 
diegetic camera films. Rather than labelling found footage a 
subgenre of horror, Aldana Reyes argues that diegetic cameras 
are utilised in existing horror subgenres, for example the 
demonic possession film, the supernatural or paranormal film 
and the monster feature. He also notes the presence of the 
‘killer video diary’ that ‘follows the … exploits of a murderer or 
group of them as they embark on a taped killing spree’ (2015, 
5). This is what I have termed the ‘charismatic killer’ category 
above. 
The Processing of Point of View 
The framework of this book is informed by Edward Branigan’s 
writings on the POV shot, Noël Burch’s theory of off-screen space 
and David Bordwell’s theories of narration. Bordwell’s seminal 
contributions stand out as a key turning point in cognitivist 
approaches to studying how viewers perceive films. As he argues, 
‘when spectators are confronted with a film that emphasizes its 
stylistic features, they will seek cues for constructing a story’ 
(1985, 36). The diegetic camera films analysed certainly 
emphasise their own stylistic features, constantly reminding the 
spectator that they are constructions that have been shot by a 
cam- era that is within the story world of the film. However, I 
believe that when these films highlight their own construction, 
they encourage the viewer to imagine that the film is a 
documentary, reality television show, or home video.  By  
foregrounding  the  construction,  mediated  realism is invoked in 
order to support their supposed non-fiction status. Their self-
consciousness makes them more immersive than traditional 
films and this is largely due to their privileging of off-screen 
space and the viewer’s imaginings and perception of this space. 
With the camera so often in the hands of a character, these shots 
must often be categorised as POV shots. 
Branigan (1984, 1992, 2006) frequently focuses on the POV  shot. 
As   a rule of thumb, the POV shot can generally be used in an 
objective manner, in order to simply show what a character is 
looking at, or it can be more subjective, as is the case in diegetic 
camera films. The POV shot offers a sense of what the character is 
feeling or thinking by putting the viewer into the eyes (or camera 
lens) of that character. Branigan identifies a number of variants 
on the POV structure, but diegetic camera films utilise one of 
these variants more than others: the continuing POV. This has 
implications for the viewer’s processing of the films particularly 
in regard to imagining off-screen space. 
Branigan’s concept of focalisation3 will also be key here, as
diegetic camera films are clear examples where characters 
provide the spectator with information about the story world. As 
Branigan states, ‘focalization (reflection) involves a character 
neither speaking (narrating, reporting, communicating) nor 
acting (focusing, focused by), but rather actually experiencing 
something through seeing or hearing it’ (1992, 101). Though we 
may hear the camera-operating character speak, and we may 
even see their actions (or decipher them from the camera 
movement), diegetic camera films offer something akin to 
internal focalisation, where ‘story world and screen are meant to 
collapse into each other, forming a perfect identity in the name 
of the character … the spectator’s task is to identify the story 
world with the mental understanding of a specific character’ 
(1992, 102). The continuing POV shot offers the viewer the 
perception of the character and also some impression of their 
mental state. Each of the films analysed later in this book is 
presented as a restricted narration where internal focalisation 
as described by Branigan is utilised. Some of this reveals what 
Branigan calls deep internal focalisation (perception and 
thoughts of the character), but the majority is surface internal 
focalisation, revealing the speech and perception of the 
character. Therefore, due to deep or surface internal 
focalisation, the viewer gains considerable knowledge about a 
character. This is knowledge about what the character is both 
seeing and feeling. This increased familiarity with the 
character’s POV should promote or assure empathy with the 
character. 
Branigan quotes Raymond Durgnat’s (2002) ‘A Long Hard Look at 
Psycho’ in saying ‘a spectator does not watch a scene through a 
profilmic camera nor think about a scene by picturing a camera 
that is watching the scene nor imagine a camera to be an invisible 
narrator or invisible character’ (2002, 92). While this may be true 
of classical Hollywood films, this claim does not apply to the body 
of horror films under discussion in this book. In the diegetic 
camera horror film, we do watch the film through a profilmic 
camera, and therefore, I suggest that we do picture a camera that 
is watching the scene. Branigan also argues that ‘al- though a 
spectator may well imagine that he or she is “inside” a fiction (or 
“inside” a character), he or she is in a different place within the 
fiction from the view that appears on screen’ (2002, 176). When a 
spectator remembers most films, he or she is likely to assemble 
what Branigan calls a ‘mental matrix that permits us to freely 
visualize’ (2002, 176). However, with diegetic camera films, I 
argue that our memory is tied to the POV of the diegetic camera 
much more closely. This means that our memory of the film is not 
only of what we witnessed, but almost exactly how we witnessed 
it. The origin of the footage is the camera that is involved in 
events on screen, and therefore, the experience must be more 
immersive. The cinematography is a key factor in our memory as 
we must imagine the position of our diegetic narrator who holds 
the cam- era. For example, when we remember scenes from 
Cloverfield, we recall details of the camera’s position at street 
level as Hud pans the camera to watch the head of the Statue of 
Liberty crash nearby. The position of the camera is memorable 
because when watching the film we are likely to imagine the 
character holding the camera. However, in our memory of the 
film, the camera-operating character is less likely to be 
remembered: instead, the captured image – and therefore the 
camera’s placement and our alignment with it – is much more 
important. We are just as likely to recall how the scene was 
filmed (and our ideas about why it was filmed this way) as what 
was filmed. Our imagination of what is happening behind the 
camera in off-screen space is vital to our understanding and 
memory of many scenes. 
This book will also complicate Noel Carroll’s dismissal of the 
concept of identification. He asserts that 
what is meant by character-identification [is] emotional duplication 
[but] very often we have different and, in fact, more information 
about what is going on in a fiction than do the protagonists, and 
consequently, what we feel is very different from what the character 
may be thought to feel. 
(1990, 91) 
However, in these films, the viewer is confined to the POV of the 
char- acter, and there is therefore much greater alignment with 
the character. Duplication of emotions is much more frequent 
and common in found footage films than Carroll would suggest 
due to the viewer’s almost identical knowledge as the character. 
But identification is still a problematic idea that will need further 
exploration, particularly with reference to Murray Smith’s theory 
of ‘recognition, alignment, and allegiance’ (1995, 73), which will 
be considered in Chapter 6. 
Developing a Cognitive Approach to Diegetic 
Camera Horror 
Cognitive theory in film and media studies began in the 1980s 
with scholars such as David Bordwell and  Noël  Carroll  initially 
challenging the psychoanalytic theory that had dominated film 
studies since the 1970s. In order to justify my use of cognitive 
film theory to elucidate the pleasures and purposes of diegetic 
camera horror, it is necessary to first clarify why I reject 
psychoanalytic theories that have been predominant in 
discussions over concepts such as identification and of the horror 
genre more generally. I also wish to acknowledge the work of 
Julian Hanich (2010) and Xavier Aldana Reyes (2016a) and 
elucidate how my own approach differs from their 
phenomenological and somatics-based approaches, respectively. 
I will argue that psychoanalytic film theory relies too heavily on 
cinema’s relation to theories of the unconscious; instead, I 
explore the cognitive processes of the viewer when he or she   is 
watching diegetic camera horror films. I emphasise how the use 
of    the diegetic camera orients our emotions and cognitions 
when watching these films. Understanding how we cognize the 
diegetic camera will help to gain an appreciation of how we feel 
about the characters that operate it, and furthermore how this 
can lead us towards certain emotions. My argument is that the 
diegetic camera is a key stimulus that provokes our emotional 
responses to these films, and that these emotions are far more 
complex than simply labelling them as pleasure and desire. 
Limits of Psychoanalytic Theories for Diegetic Camera 
Horror Films 
Psychoanalytic film theorists from Christian Metz4 (1982, 4) to
Laura Mulvey5 (1989, 14) as well as countless others are
preoccupied with cinema’s relation to the unconscious. However, 
in this study of diegetic camera horror films, I am primarily 
focussed on cinema’s complex relationship with the world, 
realism, and other non-fiction media forms such as documentary 
and home videos. I wish to look beyond Metz and Mulvey’s 
assertions  that  a  Freudian/Lacanian  approach  is  required  to 
explain the pleasures and desires of film viewing. Although I will 
be referring to the process of identification that Metz sees as the 
most important pleasure of film viewing, I argue that this is more 
intricate than psychoanalytic theory suggests and requires a 
more active engagement with the text that involves significant 
cognitive processes. I agree that identification is a crucial 
concept, but in following notable cognitive scholars such as 
Murray Smith, I will be breaking down the process of 
identification into numerous parts in order to explain the 
complex array of emotions that a viewer feels when watching a 
diegetic camera film.  My concern is with the specifics of 
emotional experience and how these are tied to the utilisation of 
a diegetic camera in the horror film genre. According to Carl 
Plantinga and Greg M. Smith, ‘the best of recent psychoanalytic 
theory is attempting to elaborate and enumerate pleasures 
instead of “pleasure,” desires instead of “desire”’ (1999, 12). For 
this book, however, the concepts of pleasure and desire are still 
too limited  as there are more complex emotions to consider 
when a diegetic camera is utilised such as empathy and 
sympathy, fear, dread, and anticipation.   I will be relying on the 
work of cognitive scholars because their central attention is on 
emotions and more specifically how these emotions are tied to 
cognitive activity. This approach stresses the activity of the 
viewer’s mind when watching the films and moves away from 
subconscious drives. 
I argue that the viewer of diegetic camera horror films has 
control over his or her cognition, actively making connections 
between media forms during the priming stage of the film and 
choosing who or what to identify with through a process of 
recognising characters and making moral evaluations about their 
actions. I will also argue that the viewer brings his or her own 
previous individual experiences, memories, schemata, and 
expectations to the film, meaning that he or she will interpret 
meaning, narrative, and aesthetics individually. 
Furthermore, Metz’s notions of primary and secondary 
identification lack the precision of cognitive theorists and their 
fuller explorations of what identification entails. The diegetic 
camera also opens up many new avenues of investigation as its 
employment contradicts much of Metz’s conception of the camera 
in cinema. For example, the diegetic camera does not provide the 
spectator with an illusion of power over the screen images, nor 
does it offer the spectator the feeling of avoiding being seen by 
those on screen. The diegetic camera is a fundamental 
component in the creation of identification, but this concept 
needs interrogating and clarifying beyond what psychoanalytic 
theory has offered in the past. 
Cognitivism and How We Think about the 
Diegetic Camera 
Cognitive theory is about studying the process of cognition or 
thinking. Encompassing a range of factors including attention, 
learning, memory, reasoning, problem-solving, and perception. 
Cognitive theory explores the conscious mind, and this makes it a 
suitable framework for analysing the diegetic camera horror film. 
I will contend that the films encourage the viewer to actively 
process the information contained within the films in specific 
ways, such as by imagining off-screen space and empathising 
with off-screen camera-operating characters. This is significant 
because it immerses the viewer and increases their investment in 
on- screen events. My question is: how do viewers respond to 
diegetic camera films and why do they respond as they do? I 
believe that cognitivism is central to answering this question 
because the use of the diegetic camera fundamentally affects the 
attention, learning, and perception of the film viewer. With their 
priming techniques, self-conscious strategies and the moral 
orientation of characters, diegetic camera films encourage 
viewers to be more engaged with the films. 
In the following sections, I will explain how priming, engagement, 
empathy, attention, alignment, and allegiance are key factors in 
the cognition of the viewer while watching diegetic camera 
horror films. I argue that priming (the subject of Chapter 3) is the 
initial process that must occur in order for the viewer to be able 
to recognise the off-screen cam- era operator as a character and 
begin imagining of off-screen space. The diegetic camera then 
affects the level of engagement of the viewer, the empathy 
generated for the characters, the way the viewer pays attention 
to the film, and how he or she becomes aligned with, and morally 
evaluates the characters. 
Priming for Point of View 
Peter Wuss’s theory of priming argues that ‘since the opening of a 
film has the function of programming the information processing 
of the whole reception process, the first sequences serve as a 
kind of priming. They formulate the aesthetic rules for the 
following course of experience’ (2009, 34). This is especially true 
of the films in this horror trend as they have to prime their 
audiences with relatively new, but easily identifiable, aesthetic 
rules for a different viewing experience. 
 
Wuss continues by stating that ‘the formation of a successful opening 
sequence (…) must (…) prepare the spectator for a specific way or style 
of film perception that leads to the aesthetic code of the artwork here 
called its “priming pattern”’ (2009, 49). The priming patterns of many 
diegetic camera horror films are strikingly similar. This will be 
developed with    a detailed analysis of the opening scenes of The Blair 
Witch Project and Rec in Chapter 3. 
Branigan’s work on the POV shot will inform my discussion of the 
stylistic techniques used in the early scenes of the film as priming. 
This is of particular importance because diegetic camera films do not 
often con- form to Branigan’s theory of the most common POV 
structures. With- out what Branigan calls the ‘point/glance’ shot to 
prepare audiences for the ‘point/object’ shot, the use of POV must be 
signalled in other ways. Therefore, these films must contain cues to 
ensure that the spectator understands the footage as a continual POV 
shot. Also, it must be under- stood by the viewer that the POV is not 
strictly that of any one character, but that of the diegetic camera. 
POV shots help to limit what the viewer sees and therefore aid 
in cre- ating feelings of anxiety. With reference to Greg M. 
Smith, I will also consider how the early scenes establish an 
emotional orientation for the viewer and help to create what 
Matt Hills (2005, 25) refers to as a mood of anticipation. The 
opening text of the films is often a key element in establishing 
an anticipatory mood that will then orient the viewer’s emo- 
tions for the remainder of the film. The viewer is primed for 
two major responses: to anticipate a disaster befalling the 
characters and to recall other media artefacts that they have 
seen in the past that have a closer relation to reality than 
fiction film – for example documentaries and home videos. 
Diegetic camera films and particularly their opening pieces of 
text also activate what Jaak Panksepp (1998) calls seeking 
emotions. Torben Grodal (2010, 65) argues that these emotions 
are often activated when watching what he calls ‘classical 
detector fictions’ – films that set up a mystery for the viewer 
to attempt to solve. Many of the diegetic camera horror films, 
specifically those that follow the victims of vio- lence (as 
opposed to those who commit acts of violence) encourage the 
viewer to hypothesise and to search for clues as to what exactly 
is going to happen further along in the narrative. The viewer 
should ideally seek answers to the mystery that is teased in the 
opening text and he or she will hope that a character with a 
camera can provide some evidence as to what exactly 
happens to the characters. What we also see in di- egetic 
camera films is the seeking system appearing to be activated in 
the camera-operating characters as they search for evidence. 
This I argue creates an alignment of systems – a shared seeking 
– between character and viewer, especially exaggerated
because of the continuing POV shots. However, these POV shots
also restrict the narration creating a strong alignment, but
limiting what the viewer sees. In Ed Tan’s volume on emotion
and the structure of narrative film, he suggests that ‘as a
privileged witness, viewers are allowed to see precisely what they
need to see, at precisely the moment they need to see it’ (1996,
55). This may be true of the formal strategy of classical
Hollywood with the tradition of seam- less continuity editing and
traditional cinematography, but the horror films discussed here
do not position the spectator in a privileged way. While we may
feel privileged in the sense of having access to a character’s vision
and perhaps even their emotions, the narration is also highly
restricted because the viewer of the film is confined to the (often
less than ideal) POV  of a character and their camera. The viewer
is primed   to experience the film from a less privileged position
than the traditional invisible observer camera. Similarly, Tan’s
assertion that ‘the invisible witness is not addressed, indeed, not
even ignored: for the characters    of the fictional world the
witness simply does not exist’ (1996, 76) does not apply to
diegetic camera horror films, where the camera operator and
camera is frequently acknowledged. The viewer must be primed
to accept this shift in their spectatorial position compared to 
when he or she watches a classical film. I argue that this can 
create a stronger form of the fear that Julian Hanich (2014) labels 
dread. Hanich argues that dread is created when we anticipate a 
shock or threat in a scene and   that dread is therefore a meta-
emotion, where the viewer actually fears another emotion, for 
example the shock or terror of something jumping out of the 
darkness at the end of a suspenseful scene. This is exacerbated by 
the diegetic camera as we see constantly from vulnerable 
character’s POV and the threat may launch itself not only at the 
character, but the camera itself (and by extension, the viewer). 
Hanich argues that ‘some- thing we can see is manageable, 
whereas unseen horror cannot be con- trolled’ (2014, 31). With 
the lack of privilege associated with the diegetic camera, many 
terrors remain half-glimpsed and therefore do not allow viewer’s 
dread to dissipate. 
Heightened Engagement in Diegetic Camera Films 
Feeling, and being primed to feel, an increased level of dread 
will heighten the viewer’s engagement, as will the activation of 
the seeking system. Aldana Reyes argues that ‘dread demands a 
complex emotional and cognitive engagement and … it also 
privileges the body of viewers and their capacity for 
suggestion’ (2016a, 111). I agree with the first part of this 
statement but believe that Aldana Reyes places too much em- 
phasis on the viewer’s body. I argue instead that viewers feel a 
sense of heightened engagement with diegetic camera horror 
films, but that this is largely due to the diegetic camera horror 
film’s use of off-screen space and correspondingly the 
prolonged use of the POV shot. Aldana Reyes claims that 
‘somatics matters’ (2016a, 186). However, somatics are not as 
central to viewer engagement as the use of off-screen space 
and the imagining of off-screen camera operators. The crew in  
fictional  films are conventionally completely invisible to the 
audience. Their presence on screen would shatter the spectator’s 
engagement with the fiction as   a believable and engaging 
narrative. Even documentaries largely keep their crews off-
screen as audiences are more concerned with the stories being 
presented than the people behind-the-scenes who have created 
them, with notable exceptions such as documentaries by Michael 
Moore and Louis Theroux. 
However, the operators in diegetic camera horror films turn the 
camera on themselves or film themselves in mirrors, 
emphasising their pronounced involvement with the subjects 
they film.  Not  only  are  these cameras engaged with the 
profilmic event, but they are also of-   ten communicating with, 
and explicitly attempting to engage with their audience. The 
camera-operating characters are aware that someone is 
watching, and the viewer can imagine that the character is 
communicating with him or her from within the  fiction.  This 
communication  and engagement can lead to greater empathy 
with the diegetic camera operator. It is tempting to assume that 
this equates to a greater sense     of identification with the 
characters, but it is vital to dissect the idea of identification 
before making this claim. 
Identification has already been broken down into different 
processes by Murray Smith who defines specific concepts within 
it. Concepts that make up his ‘structure of sympathy’ involve 
three different ways that   the spectator can ‘apprehend the 
fictional world’: these in turn involve different levels of 
engagement with the central character. The viewer may ‘imagine 
the events of the narrative from the (physical and mental) 
perspective of the character’ or they might imagine themselves 
‘in the exact situation of the character’ (1995, 80). Diegetic 
camera horror films prove adept at helping the spectator share 
the perspective of the character, but the question of whether this 
leads them to imagine themselves more easily in the situation of 
that character is debatable. I argue that diegetic camera films do 
allow the viewer to easily imagine themselves in the situation, 
but that this is not necessary as the viewer is more likely to 
imagine the off-screen camera-operating character in the 
situation. Smith also argues that the spectator simulates the 
emotions of the char- acter that they are observing by 
hypothesising about what the character is experiencing (1995, 
97). Furthermore, he suggests that hypothesising, imagining, and 
simulating are not always required. When the viewer reads the 
facial and bodily cues of a character, they may mimic those cues 
and, therefore, feel corresponding emotions. This ‘affective 
mimicry’ (1995, 99) may be harder with very limited or even 
non-existent facial cues of the camera-operating character, but 
their bodily cues will often be registered by the cinematography. 
For example, if a camera operator is running in fear, the 
camerawork will reflect this. Similarly, if a camera operator is 
startled by a noise, their camerawork will register this shock 
and may also register their seeking of what made the noise. Smith 
also identifies ‘autonomic reactions (…) such as the startle 
response’ that are involuntary and can also add to the emotional 
processes of the audience (1995, 102). Though the character and 
spectator can often be aligned when they are startled by a shock, 
Smith notes that this is not a case of the spectator ‘responding 
“through” the response of the character’ (1995, 102). In other 
words, we do not jump because the char- acter jumps; we jump 
because whatever it is that made the character also makes us 
jump. However, diegetic camera horror films provide an exam- 
ple that suggests a counter-argument: when the character who 
holds the camera is startled, it is the operator’s response itself 
that can startle the spectator. For example, if a character screams 
from behind the camera  or suddenly drops his or her camera on 
the floor, this can encourage the viewer to respond through, or 
to, the character’s response. 
Character emotions are an important factor in making the 
spectator respond in an emotional way. The emotions of the 
camera-operating characters can often be expressed through 
their use of the camera, rather than in the regular use of close-
ups. Branigan suggests that the viewer ‘is expending energy in 
reacting to something that is familiar’ (2006, 175). The energy 
that Branigan suggests the spectator is applying is the energy of 
imagining and drawing links with our own experience of the real 
world and making links between the characters and the people 
we know in real life. Moreover, in diegetic camera films, we are 
expending energy recalling other media such as documentary 
and home videos. We must recognise these forms in order to 
understand what is being mimicked in diegetic camera films. We 
activate what Bordwell calls mental schemata (1985, 31) derived 
from those previous experiences of watching other media forms 
and these schemata allow us to assess the new experience and 
recognise the similar pattern. Walton claims that ‘we seem to be      
in psychological contact with characters, sometimes even 
intimate with them (…) Often we are privy to characters’ most 
private thoughts and feelings. And we respond to what we know, 
apparently, in many of the ways in which we respond to what we 
know about the real world’ (1990, 191–192). Similarly, Tan 
argues that ‘when we watch a film, our general interest in the 
fortunes of our own loved ones and friends takes the form of 
sympathy with the fate of a particular character or characters’ 
(1996, 48). Clearly the viewer often cares deeply for the fictional 
characters, despite knowing them to be works of fiction. I would 
suggest that this is not due to interest in our loved ones as Tan 
suggests. Horror filmmakers that utilise the diegetic camera 
attempt to make this psychological link between the character 
and viewer as close as possible by persuading the audience that 
what they are watching is not an ordinary film   but the video 
testimony of a real person. Audiences are not generally fooled, 
but they may find it less difficult to project their imaginings on   
to the fiction. Because the characters communicate with the 
audience, our psychological contact with them is closer, and 
therefore, we  are more likely to share certain character’s 
emotions. However, this does  not mean that our sympathy for 
the characters is in any way linked to a more general interest in 
the fortunes of actual people that we know and care about. The 
viewer imagines that the characters are real. We do not think of 
our loved ones because we are imagining that the characters 
have their own loved ones and own reasons for feeling fear or 
sadness. 
Horror filmmakers often aim to create corresponding emotions 
be- tween characters and the audience to increase the visceral 
impact of their films. According to Carroll, in horror ‘the emotive 
responses of the audience, ideally, run parallel to the emotions of 
characters’ (1990, 17). It  is a fundamental point of diegetic 
camera horror films that the viewer shares a significant amount 
of the perception of events with a character. Identification, then, 
can be a case of almost literally putting oneself in the shoes of the 
character, as in we see from where the character sees. Gaut 
argues that when the spectator does this, he or she may then 
come to care for that character (1999, 202). Furthermore, Gaut 
maintains that ‘the viewer imagines herself to be the character 
with whom she identifies’ (1999, 202–203). By imagining oneself 
in the place of the character under the same stresses and in the 
face of the same horrors, the spectator may share or simulate the 
emotions of that character. This task is made easier by the 
constant alignment with the character’s POV and imagining the 
off-screen space behind the camera. 
The extent to which the viewer is invited into the mind and 
emotions of the character is another important factor when 
considering how these films engage the viewer. Subjectivity is 
key to encouraging identification with a character, as the more 
the spectator is aware of the character’s thoughts and feelings, 
the more likely he or she is to understand and potentially 
simulate those emotions. This suggests that the camera- 
operating character is the most likely source of identification if 
we assume that by holding the camera, the spectator is getting 
their subjective viewpoint on events. Cherry argues that 
‘subjectivity can account for the way in which the emotional and 
physiological responses of the spectator are oriented around a 
specific character’ (2009, 129). If the viewer is ‘in- side’ the 
character’s head, as opposed to simply seeing events as if from ‘in 
their shoes’, then they are more likely to respond with the same 
emotions as the character. Being inside the character’s head 
involves a greater subjectivity than merely seeing from the same 
position as the character. This again demonstrates the 
importance of off-screen  space.  Hearing the character and being 
encouraged to imagine their movement through the 
cinematography creates a direct link to the reactions and 
emotions  of the character. The viewer is forced to imagine what 
occurs not only behind the camera, but to some extent what is 
occurring in their mind. 
Identification is unlikely to be the same for all viewers. Some 
viewers will resist any attempts at making a connection between 
themselves and the characters in the film. Many viewers would 
be less likely to accept the invitation to imagine that a diegetic 
camera horror film is a non-fiction document featuring real 
people. On the other hand, horror fans that particularly enjoy 
being terrified will welcome the techniques displayed and the 
chance to imagine that they are watching a non-fiction piece of 
media. Currie draws a line between sensitive and refined readers, 
arguing that 
the sensitive reader is one who knows what emotion is expressed 
in the work and is therefore able to respond congruently to it; the 
refined reader is one who responds congruently only to works that 
have a certain kind of merit. 
(1990, 214) 
Currie also suggests that ‘our responses to fiction are 
appropriate, then, when they are (…) congruent with the emotion 
we make believe is possessed by the fictional author’ (1990, 214–
215). In diegetic camera horror films, the fictional author is the 
camera operator and his or her emotions and fears are often 
registered in the camera work and the audio, making it easier for 
the spectator to respond congruently, particularly if they are 
what Currie deems to be sensitive readers. For example, when 
Hud is screaming in fear and his camera shakes as he is caught 
between soldiers advancing towards a monster on the streets of 
Manhattan, it could be easy for viewers to feel a similar sense of 
the terror and confusion that Hud feels and performs. On the 
other hand, a refined viewer may be resistant to the techniques of 
the diegetic camera film, choosing not to imagine Hud, or to find 
his constant screaming from off-screen intrusive on the unfolding 
of on-screen events. 
There will also be times of greater and lesser emotional 
connection be- tween character and viewer throughout the 
course of the film. Often in films, climactic moments produce the 
most emotional responses in spectators and diegetic camera 
films are no different. When the characters face difficulties and 
have to make decisions, emotional engagement and cognitive 
involvement become heightened in the spectator. Wuss argues 
that ‘the affective arousal of the audience always rises when 
decisions and problem-solving seem to be approaching (…) and 
the viewer be- comes both cognitively and emotionally involved 
in what is happening’ (2009, 109). I argue that this affective 
arousal can be heightened when a camera-operating character is 
involved in this decision-making process and particularly if there 
is conflict between the camera operator and a character on 
screen. For example in Cloverfield, Rob makes the decision to find 
Beth who is trapped in a building far away from his current 
location. The camera operator Hud is not in love with Beth, like 
Rob is, so  has different feelings about risking his life to find her. 
Hud films Rob’s face in close up as Rob receives a voicemail 
message from Beth saying that she is trapped. Hud remains 
silent as this message is played. In the following shot, Rob is 
ahead of Hud moving fast down a street while  Hud is trying to 
convince Rob that finding Beth is too risky. In this sequence, we 
are not only emotionally involved with Rob, who is clearly 
determined to save a woman he loves, but we are also cognising 
about where Hud is, how he must be feeling and whether or not 
he should be following his friend into danger. The 
cinematography in Figure 0.1 reveals something of Hud’s 
emotions, but only if the viewer is willing to imagine Hud behind 
the camera. The figure offers an excellent example of a conflict for 
the viewer: Rob is troubled by what he hears on the phone and 
caught in close up, while Hud films silently to give his friend the 
impression of privacy. We can easily imagine that Hud is 
concerned both for his friend’s emotional state, but also for what 
Rob might decide to do after listening to this message. 
Despite arguments about the congruence between character and 
spectator emotions, there is often a disparity between the 
audience and the characters’ emotions. Carroll argues against 
many of the commonly held assumptions about identification, 
though his arguments do not always apply to the characters in 
diegetic camera horror films. First, he argues that there is a 
disparity between the belief in fictional monsters held by the 
characters and the lack of that belief in the viewer (1990, 17). 
This   is not always the case because often the characters in films 
such as The Blair Witch Project remain sceptical about the 
existence of the ‘monster’ just as the viewer does despite growing 
evidence of its presence. The scepticism is therefore shared by 
both some of the characters and the viewers. Because the 
characters resist drawing supernatural conclusions, the films 
engage the seeking systems of the cynical viewer as he or she 
attempts to hypothesise other reasons for what is happening to 
the characters. Carroll identifies some convergence between the 
emotions   of the characters and the emotions of the viewer but 
not total duplication. Characters provide examples of how to 
respond to monsters – with fear, disgust, or panic (1990, 22). 
Carroll’s theory rarely considers the object-less fear of films like  
The Blair Witch Project where  the  monster is unseen by either 
the protagonists or the viewer. However, the Blair Witch is still 
an object of terror, even if she is never witnessed. 
I aim to extend Carroll’s reading beyond the typical horror genre 
to include diegetic camera films. Carroll argues that character 
identification ‘cannot be based on postulating an audience 
illusion of being identical with the protagonist’ (1990, 90). One of 
his key arguments is based on the fact that the viewer is often 
given more information than the protagonist, particularly in the 
typical methodology of filmmakers creating suspense (1990, 91). 
For instance, the audience knows that the monster is 
approaching but the character does not. Therefore we experience 
dif- ferent emotions to the character. However, in diegetic camera 
horror films this is rarely the case. By limiting the viewer to the 
perceptual experience of the character with the camera, there is 
an epistemological alignment between character and spectator. 
Even when the viewer does have ‘parallel emotive appraisals’ 
(1990, 92). Carroll argues that this ‘does not entail identification’. 
Instead, he argues that ‘what we do is    not identify with 
characters but, rather, we assimilate their situation’ (1990, 95). 
We do not duplicate the character’s mental state but come to an 
understanding of it. With the prolonged alignment of diegetic 
camera films, however, I argue that there is a more pronounced 
attempt to make the viewer duplicate the feelings of the 
character that holds the camera, particularly empathising with a 
character’s feeling of dread. 
Aldana Reyes suggests that ‘horror is premised on the 
emotion of threat, an emotion that is often … shared via 
imagination and somatic empathy with intradiegetic 
characters and, most importantly, their bod- ies’ (2016a, 97). 
However, this is complicated by the idea of the off- screen 
camera operator, whose body the viewer may have to imagine 
in order to feel somatic empathy with it. While the viewer may 
‘align themselves with the harmed or tortured body’ (2016a, 
17) on screen, I wish to highlight the cognitive processes and
empathy that is created with off-screen camera operators in
the diegetic camera horror film.
Encouraging Empathy through Information Acquisition 
Neill highlights the importance of empathy in the process of 
identifying with a fictional character (1996, 183). Empathy is the 
intellectual identification with or vivid experience of another 
person or character’s feelings. I have already suggested that the 
utilisation of the diegetic camera technique in films can create 
stronger feelings of empathy between viewer and characters and 
that this is due to the viewer and the character having similar 
cognitive processes, including formulating hypotheses about 
what is happening. Empathy suggests something beyond feeling 
the same emotions as someone else; it also implies a distinct 
cognitive process that allows someone to actively engage with 
how another per- son is feeling. Neill goes on to suggest that 
identification and empathy depend on a viewer’s ability to 
imagine what the character’s beliefs and desires might be. 
Without detailed knowledge about the character, it will be harder 
for the spectator to imagine things from his or her point of view. 
Neill’s argument also considers the similarities between the 
person in the audience and the character on screen. He suggests 
that the greater the extent to which the character resembles the 
viewer, the more will the viewer be able to imagine events from 
the character’s POV. While I do  not strongly advocate that this 
similarity between viewer and character is strictly necessary, 
Neill’s work is useful for highlighting the amount  of knowledge 
the viewer has about characters and how easily the viewer can 
imagine what the character is feeling. This ties in with Smith’s 
idea  of ‘recognition’ as the viewer must be able to recognise the 
construction of a character, and imagine and understand some of 
the emotions of that character in order to feel empathy. 
Grodal describes identification as the sharing of a given 
character’s emotions that leads the viewer to simulating such 
emotions (1997, 93). Grodal suggests that the end result of 
cognitive identification will not always be empathy, but that 
feeling empathy for a character is likely to  be a consequence of 
prolonged identification. For example, the longer we spend 
identifying with the characters by being positioned in alignment 
with their POV, the more likely we will empathise with them by 
the end of the film. This is also important to the study of diegetic 
camera horror films for obvious reasons. If we accept that a 
continuing POV shot throughout the majority of a film could lead 
to increased identification and therefore empathy, then Grodal’s 
account is useful. 
Often the character and the spectator share similar interests: for 
in- stance, the character wants to survive, and the viewer hopes 
that the character will. The spectator of diegetic camera horror 
films is forced into perceptual alignment with a camera-
operating character for much  of the duration. Therefore, though 
the viewer knows it is a fiction, he or she still sees the threat (or 
senses the presence of the threat) in similar ways. Carroll 
believes the audience’s emotions are altruistic (for the character) 
whereas the character emotions are egoistic (for themselves). 
Grodal counters that there is compatibility between their 
interests (1997, 85). The spectator who is forced into perceptual 
alignment with the character does not only fear for the character, 
he or she fears for his or her self if they were in that situation 
(though he or she is aware that he or she is not). The viewer is 
expending effort in imagining that he or she is the character 
behind the camera or in imagining the mental state of the person 
who carries the diegetic camera. I posit that the effort spent 
imagining what a character is feeling is reduced due to the 
aesthetic and aural strategy of the films. Over the duration of the 
film, if the techniques have been effective, then Grodal argues 
that ‘empathy will very often be the consequence of a prolonged 
cognitive identification’ (1997, 93). The prolonged use of POV 
camera allows the viewer to  face  the same situations as the 
characters (albeit from the safety of a seat outside the diegesis), 
and this makes the experience more immersive. 
However, it is not simply the case that audiences identify and 
empathise with characters in terms of fulfilling goals such as 
staying alive. Between spectator and character, there is empathy 
beyond this convergence of desires. Grodal points to the empathy 
that occurs as a result of human bonding (1997, 94). Characters 
and their interactions are equally as important in aiding the 
spectator to identify and empathise with particular characters. 
This is important because in some diegetic camera horror films, 
the camera operator does not interact frequently (if at all) with 
his or her subjects, whereas in other examples there is frequent 
in- teraction. In Chapter 4, I will analyse the interactions between 
camera operators and their subjects to ascertain how empathy is 
produced and how the diegetic camera aids this process. 
Even the most vicious of charismatic killers converses with the 
camera operators that film them. Whether it is a killer or a victim 
behind the camera, the narrators are often unreliable. For 
example, Heather in The Blair Witch Project is more concerned 
with filming than getting out  of the woods quickly and likewise 
Micah in Paranormal Activity seems more concerned with 
capturing evidence of the supernatural than keep- ing his partner 
safe. The characters often descend into increasingly er- ratic, 
paranoid, and unstable mental states. Horror films in general, and 
diegetic camera films even more so, often end in the protagonist’s 
death. The handheld camera and first-person POV do not offer 
any safety or re- spite from a decline in mental stability, which is 
not shared by the viewer. Though some spectators may become 
increasingly jumpy, nervous, even bordering on hysterical at 
certain points during the films, they do not   go through the same 
cognitive and emotional process as the characters within the 
fiction. Horror viewers will likely have bodily responses such as 
muscle tension, speeding up of eye movements and rises in 
adrenalin, but Grodal argues that horror fictions often use 
‘problems of cognitive consistency and of paranoia,  as  both  
major  elements  in  the  creation of emotion and as means of 
involving the viewer in a claustrophobic, non-distanced 
experience’ (1997, 245). The camera-operating characters often 
cannot believe their eyes, but by capturing proof on camera, they 
seek to rationalise the irrational, or at least record it. When 
confronted with something they cannot fully understand, they 
wish to communicate an imagined witness. This reflects the 
activation of the seeking system, so although the character and 
viewer may not have similar problems of cognitive consistency, 
they will at least share a desire to have the camera seek out and 
capture something that they can then try to understand. Both 
viewer and character may not believe in monsters or witches, but 
both are more likely to believe in these things if they witness 
examples on film. The viewer knows that he or she is watching a 
fiction, but be-  comes increasingly engaged as the characters 
strive to make the viewer believe the truth of what is being 
captured with the cameras. For example, the spectator of 
Cloverfield may not scream and run like Hud, but both viewer and 
Hud are left with a sense of awe and confusion when faced with 
the monster. 
Those theorists who have specifically looked at diegetic camera 
horror films in relation to identification have used words like 
‘trapped’ (McKenzie, 2011, 37) to describe the experience of the 
spectator of found footage films. McKenzie compares the films to 
being on a ‘horrific ride’ and argues that the ‘blinkered limitations 
of the camera/viewer’s eye are the only visuals and the viewer 
passively experiences the untenable situations in which the 
characters are acted on by external forces’ (2011, 37). The idea 
that the spectator passively experiences these films may be true 
in terms of physicality but because of the continuing POV shots, I 
argue that the viewer is actively imagining his or her position in 
the narrative. While we are ‘trapped’ in the continuing POV shots, 
as on a ride, the viewer shares this experience with the 
characters. When analysing most fiction films, Carroll argues that 
‘the audience (…) frequently has access to many more scenes and 
incidents, as well as their implications, than are available to 
individual characters’ (1990, 100). However, this is not the case 
with diegetic camera horror films. More frequently, due to the 
confinement of positioning to the character’s camera’s gaze, the 
spectator and character share almost identical knowledge. Tresca 
argues that in diegetic camera horror films, 
the camera (and, thereby, the audience) only knows as much of the 
reality as the person behind the camera; therefore, if the person be- 
hind the camera cannot perceive the “reality” of the situation, it will 
remain forever beyond the grasp of the film to capture it. 
(2011, 46) 
The viewer is rarely separated from the POV of the character and 
therefore does not get to see elements that are hidden from the 
character. 
I will argue that if the spectator accumulates information in a 
consistently similar way as the character, then empathy will be 
stronger. The viewer and the character have similar cognitive 
processes; formulating hypotheses about what is happening. 
Currie points out that ‘the illusion peculiar to film is that the 
viewer is present at the events of the story’ (1995, 23) but also 
that ‘people watching movies do not behave like people who 
believe in the reality of the fictions they are watching’ (1995, 25). 
In this sense, diegetic camera horror films and other more 
traditional films are no different. The focus films do not have the 
‘capacity to make the viewer think that he or she is actually 
watching real events’ (1995, 22–23), but they do often offer 
increased intimacy and immediacy through their specific stylistic 
presentation and aesthetic and narrative strategies. The 
believability of the characters and situations and the way they are 
presented to the spectator are key to increased identification, but 
this identification is an active process. 
Attention and Cognitive Participation: Activating the 
Seeking System 
I argue that diegetic camera horror films encourage active 
cognitive par- ticipation from the viewer even more so than other 
films. The spectator does more than identify with the characters, 
hypothesise about how the film will end and empathise with the 
victims of the monster. They are encouraged to become 
participants in the film, searching the frame for monsters 
withheld from view and attempting to spot the subject that   the 
camera-operating character is trying desperately to film. Grant 
argues that these films ‘encourage or construct a spectatorial 
position that requires an intensely active engagement with the 
image’ (2013, 165).   He believes that they arouse ‘the 
epistephilic drive of the spectator’ (2013, 165), thus forcing the 
viewer to look carefully and search the frame shrewdly for 
evidence of what is menacing the protagonists. The films then 
shock the viewer by rewarding their careful gaze with an at- tack 
on the camera itself ‘and by extension, the spectator’ (2013, 168). 
Aldana Reyes argues that the screams and assaults in these films 
are ‘experienced by the image’ (2015, 154). While the character 
attempts to see (and therefore gain knowledge) by using the 
camera, the spectator   is similarly searching. The spectator is 
limited to scanning the frame presented, rather than being in 
control of  the  camera.  Aldana  Reyes has similarly highlighted 
the ‘vulnerability of the camera’ (2016b, 153) and the provoking 
of an affective reaction ‘achieved by playing with the viewer’s 
attention’ (2016b, 154). Most importantly, the seeking system is 
activated by both character and viewer and the aesthetics of the 
footage encourage this seeking to become intensified. This 
seeking is also exaggerated as the viewer feels like a privileged 
witness to the footage. He or she does not imagine that he or she 
is the finder of the footage because the footage has already had 
opening titles added and there is often evidence that editing has 
taken place, but the viewer does also feel that the footage is 
evidence that needs careful consideration to reveal its truths. 
This means that the viewer  is  constantly  working  to  maintain  
his  or her careful observation. Hanich labels ‘appraisal’ as one of 
the five components of fear in the cinema, arguing that our 
attentional focus is narrowed on what we consider to be 
threatening (2010,  20). Characters with cameras can zoom in to 
highlight important details, whereas   at other times (particularly 
when the camera is put on a fixed rig) the viewer is left to search 
the frame. Branigan argues that ‘attention is at work making 
what is “blurry” or “ambiguous” at a specific point in the space 
clearer and more vivid while making the rest of the space 
temporarily less distinct or not visible’ (2006, 62). The spectator 
of diegetic camera horror films often does not have a physically 
present protagonist in front of the camera, and therefore, his or 
her attention is not taken    up by this individual. Instead, he or 
she is more active in searching the frame for what is catching the 
attention of the protagonist who holds the camera. This also 
encourages the viewer to imagine what is occurring off-screen 
and particularly behind the camera more. 
The amateur camerawork also stimulates cognitive activity. 
The im- pulsive and often frantic movement of a diegetic camera 
operator makes it difficult for the viewer to maintain attention 
on an object. Focus can be lost and disorientation may occur. 
When this happens, the viewer’s mind must work harder on 
making sense of the on-screen action. Wuss notes that in 
Dogme films6 where the camerawork is allegedly improvised
to some degree, there is a similar ‘orienting reaction’ (2009, 
206). The camerawork, he argues, ‘seems quite uncertain and 
rarely allows reliable prognoses about the coming plot 
development’ (2009, 206–207). This leads to increased 
anxiety in the viewer, an effect in congruence with the feelings 
of the protagonist who holds the camera in diegetic camera 
horror films. Dogme films share similarities with many 
diegetic cam- era films in their shooting style, emphasis on 
improvised performances, lack of artificial lighting, and use of 
location shooting. Wuss adds that ‘the agitation consequently 
produced in the viewer … [is] produced by the camera’s 
attempts to find an orientation, provoking renewed orient- ing 
reactions in the viewer’ (2009, 207). If the cinematography 
appears improvised and uncertain and the camera operator’s 
agitation can be perceived through the cinematography, then 
the spectator will not only be more agitated, but will have to 
work harder to maintain a degree of orientation. This in turn 
makes their forensic searches of the frame more difficult and, 
perhaps, more urgent. I argue that this search for orientation 
involves imagining off-screen space, and an increased anxiety 
over what is occurring outside the frame of the continuing 
POV shot. 
Alignment and Allegiance with Camera Operators and 
Charismatic Killers 
In this book, I will be heavily drawing on Murray Smith’s notions 
of alignment and allegiance. Instead of using the term 
identification, Smith uses these terms to provide an alternative 
for ‘the psychoanalytic explanations that are put forward almost 
automatically for both the making and viewing of perverse 
material’ (1999, 218).  Smith breaks the notion  of identification 
down into three different concepts: ‘recognition, alignment, and 
allegiance’ (1995, 73). He dubs these constituent parts of the 
‘structure of sympathy’. Sympathy is similar to empathy in that it 
is the sharing of feelings between people, but it often is used to 
describe a feeling of sorrow or distress for another person. First, 
Smith asserts that we must recognise and perceive the 
construction of a character. The next stage in the structure is 
alignment. This is the process of placing the spectator in a 
position whereby, using a variety of techniques, he or she has 
access to certain actions, knowledge, and feelings of the 
characters. Finally, through allegiance spectators will make moral 
evaluations about the characters and choose whether they will 
identify with them or not. 
Smith differentiates between alignment and allegiance, 
arguing that ‘the contrast … is one between the narrative 
information that a text provides us with and the way a text 
directs our evaluation of this in- formation’ (1999, 220). This 
distinction can determine how increased alignment with 
certain characters affects the viewer’s responses, particularly 
in the case of the charismatic killer characters, which I will 
explore in depth in Chapter 5. I will not suggest that empathy 
or sympathy can be automatically produced by increased 
alignment, but that the viewer may have more complex 
feelings of attraction and repulsion when he or she is forced in 
alignment with a character. As Smith notes, ‘sympathetic 
allegiance is not automatically produced by alignment with a 
character’ (1999, 220), and the charismatic killer examples 
challenge the viewer’s feelings of antipathy to atypically 
monstrous characters. Something more than morals are at 
stake here, and ideas of allegiance are entangled and 
challenged in some of the diegetic camera films. 
Smith’s argument is that 
fictions designed to elicit perverse allegiance … are actually excep- 
tional and unusual, and that the major popular traditions that ap- 
pear to elicit them (like horror) often reveal underlying structures 
that are more complex but also more conventionally moral than … 
psychoanalytic arguments have suggested. 
(1999, 222) 
In the diegetic camera films, perverse allegiance is rarely present. 
The monstrous characters are not sympathetic and their actions 
are more likely to provoke disgust than allegiance. They cannot 
even be consid- ered anti-heroes; they are not vigilantes and 
none have any sympathetic moral code. The desire to watch them 
stems from curiosity, of which Smith notes that 
we appear to have a limitless natural curiosity in and fascination 
with the bizarre and the horrific. Such fascination and curiosity have 
an essentially amoral character and can take two forms: the first 
premised on the human kinship between ourselves (spectators, 
readers) and the object of our attention; the second on the complete 
absence of such kinship. 
(1999, 234) 
The psychopaths represented in the charismatic killer examples 
are the subject of the spectator’s amoral fascination, rather than 
perverse allegiance. The techniques used in diegetic camera films 
reward this amoral fascination in a number of ways, but they do 
not generally encourage allegiance as will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Smith considers the casting of Anthony Hopkins in The Silence of 
the Lambs (Demme, 1991) as a way of heightening the spectator’s 
aware- ness of ‘the fictional status of the character’, which allows 
‘our imaginative play with morally undesirable acts to an even 
greater extent’ (1999, 227). However, diegetic camera films often 
lack stars, encouraging a greater sense of mediated realism and 
making the process of evaluating the character’s monstrous 
actions potentially more straightforward. The spectator is not 
confronted with a fantasy world filled with stars,  but something 
different; something more like non-fiction media forms. Actors in 
the majority of these films seem to have been cast on their 
ordinary appearances, adding to the mediated realism as the cast 
look   as though they would more likely feature in a home video 
than a feature film. 
For the remainder of this book, I build my analysis on these existing 
frameworks, paying particular attention to Murray Smith’s concept of 
allegiance in order to discuss how identification is created with 
morally dubious characters in diegetic camera horror  films 
(particularly  the charismatic killers and the camera operators of 
documentaries and home videos). I will also use the concept of 
affective identification to further deconstruct how empathy is created 
in these films, especially with characters that hold cameras and are 
therefore off-screen for large amounts of diegetic time. 
Taking priming, engagement, empathy, attention, alignment, and 
allegiance as my theoretical tentpoles, I analyse how diegetic 
camera films provoke different cognitive activity to many other 
more traditional films, such as imagining of the camera and its 
operator, recognising and empathising with an off-screen 
character and activating the seeking system in order to 
empathise with the camera operator. I will be using the theories 
of Murray Smith, Peter Wuss, Torben Grodal, and Gregory Currie 
to demonstrate, challenge, and build on the ideas of allegiance, 
personal imagining, affective identification, and priming when 
watching diegetic camera films. The diegetic camera is the key 
variable here, and its usage in horror films will be shown to have 
an effect on the imaginings, empathy, and engagement of the 
viewer. I argue that the viewer imagines off-screen space 
frequently in order to recognise and empathise with the camera 
operator. I argue that the camera operator and profilmic subjects’ 
interactions with each other and the viewer create increased 
engagement. Finally, I will argue that allegiance is not affected by 
the   use of the diegetic camera. 
Methods 
In the second part of this book, I will analyse a small  sample  of  
diegetic camera horror films in order to apply the theoretical 
framework developed in the first half of  the  book.  I  begin  this  
by  investigating  the priming pattern, looking at approximately 
the first ten minutes of  the focus films. Here, I will examine how 
the opening text encourages viewer hypotheses and how the 
employment of the diegetic camera in the early scenes prepares 
the spectator to perceive the films in a manner which is repeated 
and adapted in all diegetic camera horror films. This will involve 
shot-by-shot analysis  of  key  scenes,  looking  particularly  at the 
cinematography, dialogue and reference to off-screen space. In 
Chapter 3, I will also explore how codes of various other media 
forms  are mimicked in order to give diegetic camera horror films 
a convincing non-fiction aesthetic and narrational style – i.e. their 
mediated realism.    I will focus particularly on The Blair Witch 
Project and Rec, and how  these films mimic the forms of 
documentary and reality television. In order to analyse how 
mediated realism is created, I will identify the cues nested within 
the films designed to convince the viewer of the supposed 
authenticity of the product. In my consideration of priming, I also 
analyse the use of  the  POV  shot  and,  more  specifically,  how  it  
functions in relation to Branigan’s POV structure. This will 
require  analysis  of how POV shots are constructed and 
emphasised within diegetic camera films. Following Burch’s work 
on off-screen space, I will then analyse how what is behind the 
camera is created and privileged as part of the priming process 
for the viewer. Finally, in terms of priming and point of view, I 
will address mood and emotions that are encouraged in the early 
scenes of the films. The outcome of this chapter is that I argue 
that diegetic camera films use a variety of techniques to 
encourage the viewer to imagine both off-screen space and that 
the footage on screen could be real. The effect of this is to 
heighten emotions of fear and dread that are central to the horror 
genre. 
When analysing the viewer’s response to diegetic camera horror 
films, I will be continually complicating Currie’s theory of 
personal imagining.  I will be developing this theory to 
demonstrate that the viewer is encouraged to imagine a camera 
operator that remains largely off-screen. The continuing use of 
POV shots forces the spectator to imagine seeing from within the 
diegesis, counter to Currie’s argument for impersonal imagining. 
I will reveal how the viewer is forced into active imaginings, 
both about where the camera is positioned within the diegesis 
and about what is occurring off-screen. My intervention here is in 
reconsidering Currie’s claims that we do not imagine seeing the 
film from the POV of the camera. When watching the focus films, 
imagining seeing or personal imagining is exactly what we do. 
The analysis will also examine  the cinematography in diegetic 
camera horror films and its effects on the spectator’s emotions 
and mood. The cinematography heightens anticipation and 
agitation, and inputs frequent cues to encourage the viewer to 
imagine the film is non-fiction. 
I will also analyse the engagement and empathy created between 
cam- era operator and viewer, most notably when the diegetic 
camera is used as a tool for communication with the imagined 
future audience. From behind the camera or in front of the 
camera, many of the camera operators in diegetic camera films 
will reach out beyond the diegesis to the finder of the footage. 
This means that we must identify cues that aid recognition of the 
camera-operating character, including the cinematography that 
becomes a part of the performance of the character. My analysis 
of alignment and allegiance in the diegetic camera horror film 
will involve further examination of the POV shots used, but also 
how sound and off-screen space help to increase this alignment 
between viewer and character to aid in creating a mood of dread. 
I will focus on the alignment between responses of the spectator 
and camera operator, both in the cinematography and in the 
cognitive response of viewer and char- acter at crucial moments 
of decision-making in the films. The analysis will examine how 
information is accumulated by spectator and camera- operating 
character and the effects of this epistemological alignment on 
empathy. The viewer becomes an imagined (by the character) 
part of the diegesis that the characters are in as the witness or 
finder of the foot- age. Unlike in traditional films where the 
fourth wall remains largely unbroken, diegetic camera films 
deliberately have their characters imagine their audience. This 
prompts the viewer to feel a heightened level of engagement with 
the film and leads to him or her being more attentive to what the 
character says. I will also examine the interactions between 
camera operators and their profilmic subjects to ascertain how 
empathy can be produced, and how the diegetic camera aids this 
process. Finally,  I will argue that allegiance is affected if the 
camera operator engages in amoral behaviour, as the shift from 
observer to participant is shocking and unexpected, and 
therefore, the viewer’s moral evaluation of these characters is 
increasingly negative. 
In Chapter 5, I analyse how the killers on screen are constructed 
as amorally fascinating characters that  are  both  ‘inhuman’  in  
their  lack of remorse and undeniably human in their complex 
relationships with other supporting characters. This leads to an 
examination of the inter- actions of these killers with the viewers 
of the films and how this might affect allegiance. I also analyse 
the broader aesthetic approach defined by the killers being 
camera operators, particularly in Zero  Day,  and  how this affects 
our allegiance with the characters. I will then consider how 
empathy, affective identification, and sympathetic allegiance are 
limited in these films, both with killers and their victims, before 
analysing how diegetic camera films complicate what Plantinga 
labels ‘scenes of empathy’ (1999,  239).  I argue that allegiance is 
not always a result of recognition and alignment, and that  
diegetic  camera  horror  films  are more concerned with 
engaging viewer’s curiosity than their empa- thy with monstrous 
characters. I will show how diegetic camera films, particularly 
those with charismatic killer characters reward the amoral 
fascination of the viewer using a range of techniques offering the 
viewer an experience unlike most other horror films. I will also 
argue that feelings of disgust and sadness can be heightened 
when the diegetic camera is used in these films to create 
mediated realism. 
The analytical chapters of the second half of the book  will 
investigate the cognitive processes of the viewer when watching 
specific diegetic camera horror films. The use of the diegetic 
camera is revealed as a central tool to orient our emotions when 
watching these films. With detailed reference to these filmic 
examples, I will reveal how the diegetic camera causes the viewer 
to feel specific emotions about the characters that operate it. The 
analysis will leave no question that the diegetic cam- era is a key 
piece of stimuli that provokes our emotional responses of fear, 
dread and anticipation to these films, and that these emotions are 
specific and significant. 
This Book 
Following this introduction is a genealogy of the diegetic camera 
horror film. The subsequent chapter will develop the theoretical 
context. The second half of this book is divided into three 
analytical chapters, utilising key films from around the world as 
case studies. 
In Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical framework with a detailed 
con- ceptualisation of the diegetic camera. Drawing on Branigan’s 
theories    of POV, I reveal how the diegetic camera creates POV 
shots that are different from the traditional POV shot featured in 
films that do not employ a diegetic camera. I also emphasise the 
importance of priming in the process of ensuring that audiences 
recognise the shots as taken from the POV of a diegetic camera. 
I  then  consider  issues  of  narration  and   enunciation   by   
following Branigan and Bordwell’s work on levels of narration 
and self- consciousness. Here I argue that in diegetic camera 
films, narrator and character are frequently collapsed into one 
and that the author, narrator, and character are all aware that 
there will be a viewer. I also explore how diegetic camera films 
are distinctive as the narration is confined to a single character 
or occasionally multiple characters; the key point being that the 
audience’s knowledge is limited to that of the camera-operating 
character, or the restricted viewpoint of the fixed diegetic camera 
as  with surveillance cameras. These films posit a fake enunciator 
within the diegesis, whose role it is to mask the presence of the 
real enunciator (the films’ production teams). 
In Chapter 2, I also introduce the concepts of metatextuality, 
performance, and dialogue as central concerns of this book. The 
diegetic camera has an impact on the tone of the films, creating a 
critical commentary on other media forms such as documentary, 
reality television, and home videos. Performance and dialogue 
are also affected by the use of a diegetic camera, as I argue that 
cinematography is a part of the performance of a diegetic camera 
operator. These films privilege off-screen space significantly by 
having dialogue with off-screen  characters  and the performance 
of a key character – i.e. the diegetic camera operator – occur 
largely off-screen. Noel Burch’s work on off-screen space is 
significant here due to his focus on theorising the implications of 
what occurs behind the camera. 
I conclude Chapter 2 by interrogating Gregory Currie’s theory of 
personal imagining. Currie argues that 
when I imagine merely that such and such happens, without imagin- 
ing that I see (or have other kinds of epistemic contacts with) what 
happens, we have a case of impersonal imagining. When imagining 
involves the idea that I am seeing the imagined events, we have a 
species of personal imagining … more specifically, it is a case of 
imagining seeing. 
(1995, 166) 
Currie rejects personal imagining and what he calls the ‘imagined 
observer hypothesis’, and by extension the ‘view that the 
imagining appropriate to film is imagining seeing’ (1995, 167). 
However, Currie does concede that in the case of a few 
exceptional shots (such as the POV shot), imagining seeing 
(personal imagining) is appropriate. This is why  I insist upon a 
theory of personal imagining in this book given that the diegetic 
camera clearly constitutes a stronger form of personal imagining. 
This chapter then leads on to a close analysis of the focus films 
where priming, allegiance and other concepts are used as the 
basis for an in depth analysis of specific case studies. 
The second half of this book is divided into three chapters. 
Chapter 3 reveals how the viewer is primed while watching 
diegetic camera horror films. Chapter 4 focuses on the home 
video examples and explores how interaction between diegetic 
camera operators and the subjects on screen affects the emotions 
of the viewer. Chapter 5 considers the charismatic killer 
examples and through analysis, reveals how allegiance is 
problematic despite the promises of the diegetic camera. 
My conclusions revolve around the activity of the viewer, 
particularly in terms of the imagining of the  film as  a  non-
fiction  document,  and the imagining of off-screen space in order 
to recognise the camera op- erator as a character. I argue that this 
imagining can heighten empathy with camera-operating 
characters, particularly when these characters are involved in 
interactions with profilmic subjects. With regard to al- legiance, I 
conclude that the diegetic camera is unlikely to affect the 
viewer’s moral evaluation of characters, except in the case of 
camera op- erators that become profilmic subjects and engage in 
amoral behaviour. Finally, I detail how the findings of this book 
can be used to explore the use of diegetic cameras beyond horror, 
beyond found footage, and how   a cognitive approach will aid 
scholars in their understanding of diegetic cameras in the future. 
Notes 
1 According  to  fan-made  lists  on  IMDb,  for  example,  here:  www.imdb.com/ 
list/ls052694809/ Though there is some debate about whether all of these 
films could be categorised as ‘found footage’, there are over a hundred that 
are recognisable examples. There are also  an  increasing  number  of  stud- 
ies that have paid attention to this subgenre including an entire issue of 
Ol3Media: e-journal of Cinema, Television and Media Studies (http://host. 
uniroma3.it/riviste/Ol3Media/archivio_files/Ol3Media%2009%20Horror. 
pdf) as well as Alexandra Heller-Nicholas’ volume Found Footage Horror 
Films: Fear and the Appearance of Reality. 
2 All budgets and box office figures are sourced from Box Office Mojo and/ 
or the Internet Movie Database in order to triangulate data and confirm 
reliability where possible. On some occasions, the figures can only be found 
on one of these two sites. 
3 Focalisation is a term used in narratological studies recognising that charac- 
ters also provide spectators with relevant information. Branigan borrows the 
term ‘focalization’ from Genette (1980) who uses it to distinguish between 
three different types of restriction of narrative information: zero, internal 
and external. Branigan positions focalisation in a hierarchy of narrations 
below the first four levels that make use of narrators. 
4 Metz argues that cinema can be used to explore the unconscious  dream 
state. 
5 Mulvey argues that the structure of film form reflects the unconscious of 
patriarchal society. 
6 Wuss refers specifically to Breaking the Waves (von Trier, 1996). Breaking 
the Waves is not strictly a Dogme film as it does not follow all of the rules  
laid out in the manifesto. 
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